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SECURITY DEVICES
Thomas A. Harrell*
SURETYSHIP
Louisiana Civil Code article 3045 grants the right of dis-
cussion to a surety in the following terms:
The obligation of the surety towards the creditor is to
pay him in case the debtor should not ... and the prop-
erty of such debtor is to be previously discussed.., unless
the surety should have renounced the plea of discussion
or should be bound jointly in solido with the debtor in
which case the effects of his engagement are to be regulated
by the same principles which have been established for
debtors in solido (emphasis added).
The unsatisfactory nature of the right of discussion has
caused creditors to require its waiver almost universally. This
is ordinarily accomplished by having a surety stipulate he is
bound "in solido" with the debtor. The last clause of article
3045 seems to indicate such an agreement has a greater effect
than a simple waiver of the right of discussion by implying
the effects of such a contract are regulated by "the same
principles which have been established for debtors in solido."
This presents difficulties in that the rules regulating the lia-
bility of solidary obligors in some cases conflict with those
regulating suretyship.1 The courts have been inconsistent as
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The most significant of these conflicts can be summarized as follows:
(1) The remission of the debt in favor of the principal obligor releases a surety
absolutely, while the remission of the surety's obligation has no effect upon
the liability of the principal debtor. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2205. On the other
hand, the remission of the obligation as to one solidary obligor completely re-
leases the other obligors unless the debtor reserves his rights against them,
in which event, however, he is bound to reduce his claim against the remain-
ing debtors by the part of him who has been released. Id. art. 2203. (2) An
extension of the time or prolongation of the term of the indebtedness given to
the debtor releases a surety but does not release a co-obligor who is bound in
solido. Id. art. 3063. (3) A surety who pays the primary obligation without
being sued by the debtor loses his right to contribution from his co-sureties.
Id. art. 3058. (4) The filing of a suit against or acknowledgment of the debt
by one solidary obligor interrupts prescription as to all solidary obligors. A
suit against the surety or an acknowledgment of the debt by him does not
serve to interrupt the prescription running against the primary debtor. Id.
arts. 2097, 3552.
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to which set of rules applies to the surety who stipulates he is
bound "in solido" with the debtor, and have never articulated
a satisfactory rationale for determining which rules are
applicable. In Louisiana Bank and Trust Co. of Crowley v.
Boutte,2 four shareholders of a corporation had executed a
continuing guaranty agreement in favor of the plaintiff bank
by which they agreed to pay certain indebtedness of the cor-
poration "as sureties in solido." The corporation defaulted on
its loans and after filing a suit against it and the four
sureties, the bank compromised its claim with the corporation
and three of the sureties. It expressly reserved "its rights"
against the remaining surety, who then pleaded he had been
released because of the discharge granted to the principal
debtor, the corporation.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that inasmuch as the
.sureties had agreed to be bound in solido with the corpora-
tion, article 3045 rendered the rules of suretyship inapplica-
ble, that the surety's relationship with the creditor should be
governed by the rules of solidarity, and that accordingly the
bank could recover from the surety, but only after deduction
of four-fifths of the debt as the part of those who had been
released.3 It thus treated the three other sureties and the
corporation as four of five solidary obligors. The court sum-
marized the reason for its holding as follows: "[T]he effect of
the application of these articles [3045 and 2106] is such that as
between the creditor and the solidary surety the obligations
of the surety are governed by the rules of solidary obligors ....
Among the co-obligors, however, bound in solido, the rela-
tionships may be governed by the rules of suretyship. ' 4
The differences between the effects of suretyship and
those of solidarity arise from the basic nature of the under-
takings of the obligors. The rules pertaining to one arrange-
ment cannot consistently be applied to the other without
reaching conclusions that are inherently contradictory. This
fact has generally been obscured in the cases because the
2. 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975). The case also contains an extensive discus-
sion of the jurisprudence on the subject.
3. "The remission or conventional discharge in favor of the co-debtors in
solido, discharges all the others, unless the creditor has expressly reserved
his right against the latter.
In the latter case, he can not claim the debt without making a deduction
of the part of him to whom he has made the remission." LA. CIV. CODE art.
2203.
4. 309 So. 2d at 278.
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liability of a surety who has waived the plea of division has
sometimes been characterized as being "solidary" in nature. 5
However, such Solidarity is not that of a "solidary obligor" as
defined by the code.
The term "solidarity" is commonly used in two senses. In
its most common usage it refers to a situation in which two or
more parties have jointly bound themselves for the perfor-
mance of a single obligation with the same cause and have
agreed with the creditor that he may seek performance from
any or all of them indistinguishably.6 The term also refers to
any situation in which a creditor may call upon any one of
several parties for performance when that performance will
discharge all of the parties who may be bound to him, even
though their liability may arise from different obligations
with different causes.7
The "solidarity" inherent in the contract of a surety who
has waived the plea of discussion is of the latter nature.
Suretyship is a separate, nominate agreement between the
surety and the creditor regulated by its own terms. No con-
tractual relationship need exist between the surety and the
debtor whose obligation is guaranteed. More importantly,
suretyship is by its nature accessory to the obligation the
surety guarantees; it is given to secure the performance by
5. "The contract of suretyship under these provisions of law is of mixed
character. The obligation of each surety is to pay the whole debt. But this
solidarity is tempered by the right of division. This right, however, rests in
facultate. The surety has the right to demand the division but until the right
is exercised the obligation is solidary." McCausland v. Lyons, 4 La. Ann. 273,
274 (1849). "The obligation sued upon is manifestly one of suretyship; and
solidarity is of the nature of that contract." Kilgore v. Tippit, 26 La. Ann. 624,
625 (1874) (emphasis added).
6. "Where there are more than one obligor or obligee named in the same
contract, the obligation it may produce may be either several or joint or in
solido ... ." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2077. See also id., art. 2091.
7. The two types of solidarity are sometimes referred to as "perfect" and
"imperfect." Although the validity of classifying solidarity in such a manner
has been debated by civilians, it is clear that the code articles on solidarity
assume, at least in matters of contract, a mutuality of interest between the
obligors in solido with respect to the engagements of each other, whereas the
articles on suretyship assume the surety to be acting independently of the
primary debtor. Unless this is recognized in distinguishing the effects of the
two concepts confusion will continue to occur in the cases. Perhaps the best
and most succinct summary of the distinction in question is found in J. D.
SMITH, LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS ON CONVENTIONAL OBLI-
GATIONS 350-51 (4th ed. 1973), discussing the case of Gay v. Blanchard, 32 La.
Ann. 497 (1880), the leading Louisiana authority on the subject.
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another, not to undertake independently direct responsibility
for such performance. 8 It is thus entirely consistent for a
surety who, by waiving the right of discussion, has agreed to
perform the obligation without requiring the creditor to first
resort to an action against the primary obligor to charac-
terize his liability as being "solidary" without intending to
negate the essentially secondary and accessory nature of his
undertaking.
On the other hand, the particular articles of the Civil
Code regulating the rights and duties of solidary obligors
clearly assume that there is but one obligation to which all
obligors are a party. Since all are bound on the same under-
taking, a contractual relationship is also assumed to exist
between them so that each is to some extent bound for the
performance of the other. At the same time article 2106 rec-
ognizes that one of them may in substance merely be lending
his credit to the other.9
The court in Boutte not only failed to recognize the differ-
ences inherent in the nature of solidarity and suretyship but
assumed that to characterize a debtor's liability as being
solidary requires the creditor to deal with the debtor in all
circumstances as though he were responsible in equal propor-
tions with the other obligor.' 0 It was thus led to the conclu-
8. "A principal contract is one entered into by both parties on their own
accounts.... An accessory contract is made for assuring the performance of a
prior contract, either by the same parties or by others; such as suretyship,
mortgage and pledge." LA. CIV. CODE art. 1771. The idea of the accessory
nature of security is absolutely fundamental to the civil law and permeates
the concepts of suretyship, pledge, mortgage and privilege as they are ex-
pressed in the Code.
9. "If the affair for which the debt has been contracted in solido, concerns
only one of the coobligors in solido, that one is liable for the whole debt
towards the other codebtors, who, with regard to him, are considered only as
his securities." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2106.
10. The court noted that the question of whether the defendant might be
liable for more than one-fifth of the debt was not before it because the
plaintiff had not asked for an increase in the award of the court of appeal,
which had in the first instance determined the defendant to be liable for such
amount. However, its comments in this regard clearly indicate it had in mind
the problem of whether the terms of the particular agreement might have
imposed upon the defendant a greater liability. In its affirmance of the deci-
sion of the court of appeal it necessarily determined that the defendant was
liable for at least one-fifth of the debt. The court obviously assumed that
before it could hold the defendant to have been completely released it would
have to determine that the contract before it was one of suretyship. "Defen-
dant's argument that the release of the principal operated to discharge his,
[Vol. 36
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sion that when article 3045 mentions that a surety who is
bound "jointly in solido with the debtor" is to have the effects
of his engagement regulated by the rules of solidarity, it was
in fact declaring that a surety who says he is bound solidarily
has renounced his accessory status.
If the rule of the Boutte case is applied to the situation in
which one agrees to be surety in solido for another who is
already bound for the debt without the knowledge or consent
of the primary debtor, the error in the court's opinion in this
regard will become manifest. Under the Boutte case if the
creditor releases the principal debtor but reserves his rights
against the "solidary" surety he may still hold the surety for
one-half of the debt. Conversely, if one consistently applies
the rule, a release of the surety without a reservation of
rights against the primary obligor would entirely release him.
Even if the creditor reserves his rights he could hold the
primary debtor for no more than one-half of the debt.
Of course, the Boutte case only stands for the proposition
that rules of solidarity should be applied to the surety's rela-
tionship with the creditor. It is not necessary to extend its
holding to require that the same rules govern the liability of
the primary debtor to the creditor. In fact, the release of the
surety should not affect the primary debtor's liability. Having
unconditionally and primarily incurred the obligation without
regard to the existence of the separate agreement of the
surety, the debtor would have no complaint that his rights
have been impaired or injured. Article 2106 makes it clear
that the debtor who pays the debt has no claim for contribu-
tion against the surety. The surety's release thus does him no
harm, he is not a party to the surety's agreement, and it does
not violate his contract with the creditor. However, the same
factors then suggest a proper application of the rules regulat-
ing the effects of solidarity lead to the conclusion, contrary to
the result of the Boutte case, that the release of the primary
debtor should completely release the "solidary" surety.
The remission of a debt as to one solidary obligor requires
the creditor to reduce his claim against the other "for the
part of him to whom he has made the remission."1 1 Similarly,
the surety's, liability depends upon classifying the instrument of 'continuing
guaranty' as a contract of suretyship." 309 So. 2d at 276. It then determined
it could not do this because of its understanding of LA. CIV. CODE art. 3045.
309 So. 2d at 279.
11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2203.
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if one of the debtors pays the whole debt he can claim con-
tribution from the others for "no more than the part and
portion of each."'12 Article 2106 then provides that if the affair
"concerns" only one of the parties he is deemed to be a pri-
mary obligor and the others are his sureties. Therefore, in such
a case his "part" of the debt is the whole amount. Accord-
ingly, his co-obligors may, as sureties, recover all of the debt
from him if they have to pay it and he can recover nothing
from them if he pays.
Now it is true that in many cases the creditor may be
unaware of the relationship between his debtors. In the ab-
sence of a contrary agreement he may assume them to be
equally interested in and proportionately liable for the debt.
But this certainly would not be true if the creditor were to
expressly recognize the part of the debt each of the debtors is
to bear. The reasons for the rules relating to remission are
completely in accord with this premise.
Ordinarily, a creditor could not release one solidary ob-
ligor from his obligation and still hold the other for the entire
amount of the debt without violating the engagements he has
made with each. For, if after releasing the first debtor the
creditor were to call upon the second for the payment in full,
the latter would immediately call upon the released debtor for
contribution of his part of the debt' 3 and at the same time
would demand to be subrogated by the creditor to the claim
against the other debtor. This the creditor could no longer do.
If the unreleased debtor is denied either contribution or sub-
rogation, his rights have been severely abridged without his
consent. On the other hand, if such rights are given to him
then the creditor would be forcing the obligor whom he re-
leased to pay the debt from which he has been released. One
may rationalize the rule embodied in article 2203 on either
theory. In any event the result is the same and the principle
is directly embodied in the article; a creditor may not recover
that part of the obligation owed by the debtor to whom a
release has been given.
A stipulation with a creditor that one will be bound "as a
surety in solido" with another should ordinarily be equivalent
to a stipulation by the creditor that the other debtor's "part"
of the debt is the entire amount. Certainly in most cases the
denomination of a party as a "surety" in an instrument
12. Id. art. 2104.
13. Id. art. 2103.
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should imply that the creditor is not to impair the right of
subrogation of the surety to all of the rights against the
principal debtor nor to release the debtor without also com-
pletely exonerating the surety. Contrariwise the primary
debtor, having recognized by his independent undertaking
that the matter is exclusively his concern, should be held to
have impliedly agreed that a release of the so-called surety
will not affect his liability.
Reading article 3045 from this perspective, it is obvious
that the redactors did not have in mind the far-reaching
consequences that the court ascribed to its last clause. The
obvious purpose of the article is to establish the right of
discussion for sureties in general.14 It then recognizes two
situations in which one who is in substance a surety may not
avail himself of the right. The first is when he has contracted
as a surety but waived the right of discussion, thus becoming
bound "solidarily" with the principal debtor, but still upon a
contract of suretyship. The second is when he has contracted
"jointly in solido with the debtor" as a primary obligor in the
14. Any rationale of the Code which ascribes to article 3045 the far-
reaching effects assumed by Boutte is incomplete without an explanation of
why the redactors chose to place it as an almost parenthetical note to an
article whose obvious purpose is to regulate when the plea of discussion is
available to sureties. To conclude that its authors intended to establish a rule
.which in substance would declare that, at least between the creditor and
surety, the rules of suretyship are not applicable if the latter waives the plea
of discussion or says he is bound solidarily with the debtor, would be to give
the clause a greater and more far-reaching effect than the rule it modifies.
This is certainly contrary to the principles of arrangement that normally
were followed in the preparation of the Code. If, however, one assumes the
latter part of article 3045 in substance means: "the plea of discussion is not
available to a surety who has waived it, nor to one who has bound himself,
not as a surety but as primary obligor in solido jointly with the debtor (for in
such a case there is no contract of suretyship and his liability is that of a
solidary obligor bound with the debtor)," it would then appear that the
clause in question would not be establishing a rule but merely describing the
effect of what would otherwise follow by virtue of the nature of the parties'
agreements. That is, it is declarative, not dispositive. This is entirely consis-
tent with the parenthetical nature of the clause. Were article 2106 to contain
a clause stating, "nor shall such parties [who are bound solidarily on the debt
with another but who have no interest in the matter] be entitled to plead
discussion," precisely the same assumption would be present: that the par-
ties, while actually sureties, are n6t bound as such to the creditor-but it is
doubtful the courts would have found it necessary to conclude the purpose of
such a clause to be as they have apparently conceived the purpose of article
3045 to be: to decide in the first instance whether the rules of suretyship or of
solidarity are applicable.
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manner contemplated by article 2106. In the latter instance
there is no contract of suretyship but only the one on which
he and the debtor are both bound as primary obligors.
In the first instance, the articles on suretyship should
regulate the relationship of the parties. In the second, the
articles on solidarity would be applicable since as to the credi-
tor there is no agreement of suretyship, but only the one
agreement with his debtors who are both principals. 15 If the
agreement with the creditor is silent as to the underlying
relationship between the parties he of course may assume
that they are equally interested in the matter, enabling him
to treat them as equally bound. If, however, one of the parties
is characterized as a "surety" it would ordinarily be a recog-
nition by the creditor that the matter concerns only the other
debtor and that the surety who renders performance is to be
completely subrogated to the claim of the creditor against
such debtor. In this case no substantial difference in the
liability of the parties would result from application of the
articles on suretyship as distinguished from those on ordi-
nary solidarity except to the extent the latter rules assume
each of the obligors has held the other out to the creditor as
being able to act for both. For example, the filing of a suit
15. The difference between being bound primarily on the obligation as a
principal and secondarily bound for it as a surety, which is at the heart of the
problem, is sometimes obscured when the primary obligation is for the simple
payment of a debt. However, when the contractual relationships are more
complex the distinction is much more easily seen and has been recognized by
the courts in situations which are intrinsically in conflict with the rule
announced by the Boutte case. The Private Works Act, LA. R.S. 9:4803 (Supp.
1962), affirmatively declares the surety of a contractor is solidarily liable on
his bond with the contractor. The courts have never considered this provision
to do more than waive the pleas of division and discussion. Nor could they do
so without negating the basic provisions of the Act which clearly contemplate
that the "solidary" surety in such a case is still a surety. To apply the articles
on solidarity would also dictate that one might thereafter properly refer to
the surety as a "joint contractor" with the builder. Obviously he is not.
Persons who for valid business or pecuniary reasons have verbally con-
tracted with a creditor to undertake responsibility for debts of others have
sometimes attempted to escape liability on the grounds that such a contract
is required to be in writing by article 2278. The courts have rejected their
pleas holding that such an undertaking is not accessory but primary and
direct. See Collier v. Brown, 11 La. App. 567, 569, 141 So. 405, 406 (1932), where
the court held "Brown [the third person] did not become surety for Willard
[the original debtor] . . . but became bound as principal with him for the
payment of the account. Two persons may be bound as principals for the
same debt, where as between them only one in reality should pay it."
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against or acknowledgment of the debt by either should
interrupt prescription as to both, the extension of time to
perform given one party, unless it constitutes a novation,
should not affect the liability of the other, and so forth.
At the heart of the problem is the overriding considera-
tion, sometimes overlooked, that the matter is one of contract,
not imperative law. The task of the court is always to arrive
at the intention of the parties as to the effects to be given to
their engagements, remembering that they are free to make
such modifications to the normal consequences of their
agreement as are not contrary to public policy. Any rule es-
tablishing that, as a matter of law, the presence in an agree-
ment of words that actually may be consistent with two or
more premises imposes upon the parties one set of conse-
quences rather than the other will undoubtedly lead to unjust
and erroneous conclusions. The apparent conclusion by the
court that the words "in solido" in a contract negate the
existence of a relationship of suretyship when the parties
may have at the same time characterized themselves as being
''sureties" is just such a rule.
Furthermore, the author submits that for over a century
the almost universal commercial practice in this state has
been to require a surety to waive the pleas of division and
discussion by agreeing to be bound "in solido" as a surety, but
without any intention of negating the essentially accessory
nature of his contract. Any rule of law so obviously contrary
to such an established practice cannot but create confusion
and impose upon parties consequences totally contrary to
their understanding. It is neither necessary, proper nor
realistic to do so.
The first inquiry should always be whether the party
claiming to be a surety has contracted as a principal or as an
accessory; is he undertaking joint responsibility for perform-
ance in fact or only guaranteeing performance by another
with whom the primary contract is made? The second should
be: given the basic nature of the agreement, either as a prin-
cipal undertaking or suretyship, to what extent have the par-
ties modified the normal consequences of such an engagement
by the particular stipulations or conditions of their agree-
ment?
